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INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK LICENSING
AGREEMENTS: A KEY TO FUTURE
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
A trademark is a symbol, in any form, which identifies a product
as belonging to the manufacturer who produces the product to which
the trademark is attached.' The trademark was created so that a
product could be identified according to its producer or distributor.2
Due to its potentially unlimited life, it is said that the trademark
"like good wine, often tends to get better with age." 3 The value of
the trademark is derived from its dual purpose.4 First, it enables
consumers to distinguish particular products.5 Second, it protects
the trademark owner's goodwill and the trade or business to which
the trademark is connected. 6
Often the trademark enters a foreign market through the use of
a licensing agreement. 7 Although the trademark is not a direct conveyor of technology, it becomes an integral part of the transfer of
technology because it is a mark which identifies products manufactured through the trademark licensing agreement.8 A licensing
agreement is defined as the authorized use of a trademark owner's
1. V. NANDA, THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 6-14 (1982).
2. UNCTAD, Annex I, 7 WORLD DEv. 747 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Annex I); Soberanis, The Need to Establish a Policy Restricting the Use of Foreign Trademarks in Developing
Countries: The Case ofMexico, 7 WORLD DEv. 713, 714 (1979); L. HOLMQVIST, DEGENERATION OF TRADEMARKS 300 (1980).
3. R. GOLDSCHEIDER, TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 155-56 (1984). Unlike patents, the lives of which are limited to seventeen years in the United States (twenty years
in many other countries), trademarks can live virtually forever. Generally, upon the payment
of a licensing fee to the trademark registry in the country in which the trademark is used, the
trademark's life is automatically extended.
4. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ROLE OF TRADEMARKS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES I U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/3/Rev. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
UNCTAD]. See also, Soberanis, supra note 2, at 714; Annex 1, supra note 2, at 747.
5. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 1. By serving the function of identifying a particular
manufacturer's products, the trademark protects the interest of the public. It enables a consumer to repeatedly select a product with the assurance of similar or consistent quality being
guaranteed. See Soberanis, supra note 2, at 714.
6. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Ball, Attitudes of Developing Countries to Trademarks, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 160, 163
(1984). The licensing agreement is a common device implemented in developing States between international firms and domestic manufacturers but, with respect to the trademark, it is a

relatively new creation. GOLDSCHEIDER, supra note 3, at 124.
8. NANDA, supra note I, at 6-14.
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trademark by a licensee. 9 Until a decade ago, the trademark owner
was virtually unrestrained in business dealings with foreign licensees
in developing States.' 0 Frequently, these transactions were too hastily negotiated by the licensee in the developing State.'" Not surprisingly, the result has been that many developing States have acquired
12
technology ill-fitted to their domestic needs.
Developing States claim that trademarks hinder the acquisition
of technology while causing a form of cultural and commercial dependence on foreign trademarked goods.' 3 For example, consumers
in Mexico have made a radical switch from local to foreign soft drink
products, specifically, Coca-Cola. 4 Today, Coca-Cola dominates the
Mexican soft drink market place.15
Another example clearly depicting the harsh effect of the presence of foreign trademarks is the Mexican consumers' preference for
refrigerators sold bearing a foreign trademark.' 6 The same manufacturer produces an identical refrigerator with a domestic trademark
which costs less. Consumer preference is so slanted because of the
advertising efforts of foreign trademark owners that consumers will
spend more merely to acquire the foreign label.' 7 This problem is
aggravated by the fact that roughly one-half of the trademarks in
force in developing States are owned by foreigners.'" Since the foreign licensor ordinarily has the greater bargaining power, the domestic licensee ends up bearing a disproportionate share of the risks and
9. Gabay, The Role of Trademarks in Consumer Protection and Development in Developing Countries, 3 INDUS. PROP. 102, 108 (1981).
10. M. FINNEGAN & R. GOLDSCHEIDER, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING 520.33
(1980).
11. Until about ten years ago, licensees in developing States acted with naive ambition.
This was due to their lack of education and understanding in the fields of technology and the
law of antitrust. Id.
12. Id.
13. Through the use of advertising, trademarks have created an illogical brand of loyalty
which in turn has raised prices. See Shanahan, The Trademark Right: Consumer Protection or
Monopoly?, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 233 (1982); DEP'T OF STATE., THE UNITED STATES AND
THE THIRD WORLD (Discussion Paper 56, 1976).

14. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 36. Coca-Cola export controls over forty-two percent
(42%) of all Mexican soft drink sales. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
15.

Id.

16. Soberanis, supra note 2, at 715.
17. Id.
18. Shanahan, supra note 13, at 233. In 1977, developing States accounted for less than
one-third of the registered trademarks in the world. Of those, about half were owned by for-

eigners. See also UNCTAD, Annex H, 7 WORLD DEV. 751 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Annex
II].
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costs in the trademark license agreement.' 9
Developing States have responded by providing increased preferential treatment to local industries at the expense of foreign firms. 20
This is being done through the use of drastic national measures. 2 t In
response to this, the foreign trademark owners are becoming increasingly reluctant to market their trademarks in those States having policies which preclude them from obtaining a reasonable return on
their investment.22 The foreign trademark is perceived by developing
States as a conduit through which much needed technology and marketing skills can be acquired. 23 As the local producer benefits from
these transfers, the foreign trademark is being diverted for local
industry.

24

The dark side of this is that developing States are finding themselves with restricted access to new technology and restricted means
with which to acquire it.2 5 Consequently, the developing States are
often depriving themselves of much-needed technological
assistance.

26

This Comment maintains that the trademark is a major mechanism through which the transfers of new technology to developing
19. Ball, supra note 7, at 163. The foreign licensor retains ownership and control of the
trademark. The success of the foreign trademark is entirely dependent on the efforts of the
local licensee. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 22. The licensee is at the mercy of the foreign
trademark owner. Either the trademark license expires once sales have reached levels satisfactory to the trademark owner, or he can terminate the license. The local licensee can then opt
for renewal at a cost. The licensee can, however, market products under a domestic trademark
which enjoys significantly less goodwill compared to the foreign trademark. O'Brien, The International Trademark System and the Developing Countries, 19 IDEA 89, 93 (1978).
20.

Ball, supra note 7, at 160.

21. Id. at 164. For example, the pharmaceutical industry has been the target of many
developing States in their fight against the effects of the foreign trademark. In 1972, Pakistan
banned all use of trademarks for pharmaceutical products. In 1971, Sri Lanka proposed a
similar measure. Although both of these policies were reversed several years later, they have
had somewhat of a deterrent effect on the use of foreign trademarked products. Id. at 167.
Another example of such drastic measures, on a much broader scale, was adopted as a
regional measure by the Andean Pact States (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). These States flatly refuse a trademark license which contains any of the following provisions: (a) a limitation on the licensee's right to export; (b) a restriction, by the licensor, on the
sale or resale of the trademarked product; or, (c) a requirement that the local subsidiary pay
royalties to its foreign parent company. Id. at 169.
22. Id. at 161.
23. Id. at 160; Cf Williams, The Transnational Transfer of Technology to Developing
Countries, MADRID CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE WORLD 24 (The World Peace

Through Law Center, No. 72, 1979).
24. Ball, supra note 7, at 160.
25. See Lanahan, Trademarks in Mexico, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 205 (1976).

26. Id.
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States are accomplished.27 Harsh national legislative measures implemented by developing States discourage foreign trademark owners
from engaging in licensing agreements with licensees in such States. 28
Such measures significantly curtail the developing State's access to,
and use of, new technology, and also deprive the trademark owner of
the economic benefit of ownership.
To demonstrate this proposition, the definition of a trademark
will first be discussed. A brief history of the major international
trademark agreements will then be reviewed. This discussion will
demonstrate how these agreements overlook the area of international
trademark licensing agreements. Next, the developing States' point
of view with regard to licensing agreements will be examined. This
will be demonstrated by way of a comparative analysis of selected
developing States' circumstances and the measures which they have
taken. Finally, an approach to, and suggestions for, a model code for
international trademark licensing agreements will be recommended.
Once the inequities of the present trademark licensing system are
overcome, the licensing agreement will prove to be a major conveyor
of new technology to developing States.
I.

TRADEMARK DEFINED

Although the primary role of the trademark is to identify a
product, it has also developed into a marketing tool by which a manufacturer or producer acquires economic and market strength.29
The role of the trademark has evolved throughout history and
has taken on various forms and meanings. No one really knows how
or why the trademark was first created.3 ° From branding cattle and
other animals by primitive man, to indicating the maker's name or
factory mark on pieces of Greek, Roman and Chinese pottery, such
marks or inscriptions have existed since the beginning of mankind.3 '
The development of the modern trademark occurred during the
industrial revolution.3 2 With the advent of mass production of goods
27. Ball, supra note 7, at 161.
28. Id. at 166.
29. Id.
30. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222
(1983). One possible explanation is that early man wanted to suggest ownership or recognition
of something he had created.
31. Id. at 223-24. The earliest identified markings on bricks and tiles come from Mesopotamia and Egypt. Many Roman terracotta tiles and bricks have survived. Typically, these bear
either the maker's names or a factory mark. Id. at 225.
32. Id. at 237-39.
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for public consumption, trademarks became a necessity in order that
the origin of goods could be identified.
Today, the trademark has two significant functions. First, it distinguishes and identifies goods originating from a particular manufacturer or distributor.3" Second, it serves as a quality identifier for
consumers.3 4 Once a manufacturer's goods are identified with a
trademark, the consumer can either purchase them again or avoid
them altogether depending on whether he was satisfied the first
time.3 5
A.

Trademark's Function in the Creation of Goodwill

Goodwill has been defined as "the attachment of buyers to, and
their propensity to purchase, the product of the particular firm."3 6
Goodwill can be generated through the advertising efforts of the
trademark owner or by consumer satisfaction with the product's
37
quality.
Goodwill is borne from, and is embodied in, the concept of
brand proliferation. 8 It develops when consumers identify the producer as being satisfactory, and it thereby stimulates subsequent
purchases by the consuming public.3 9 Hence, the trademark is not
only a symbol of goodwill, it is a method for the actual creation and
perpetuation of goodwill."
33. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 2; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
34. The primary purpose of the trademark is to identify and distinguish goods from one
another, thereby serving the interests of the consumer. See Annex 1, supra note 2, at 747.
However, its secondary function, promoting the trademark's goodwill, has acquired an overriding importance. The trademark owner's economic benefits derive from this secondary function.
Without these benefits, the trademark's identifying function would become non-existent. See
Shanahan, supra note 13, at 238-41. Contra Annex II, supra note 18, at 751. Among other
countries, Cuba and India have enacted legislation which allows the use of only the generic
names, not brand names, in the pharmaceutical industry. Through the use of generic names,
consumers are still able to identify different products.
35. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 2.
36. H. EDWARDS, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN THE BRITISH SOAP INDUSTRY 26
(1962).
37. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 2, 7-9. A trademark owner's advertising efforts influence
the purchasing public. When effectively done, such efforts persuade consumers to select one
brand over another. Equally important is the concept of brand loyalty which can either create
or destroy goodwill, whether such is due to advertising or consumer selection. Id.
38. Brand loyalty is an artificial concept whereby consumers repeatedly select or avoid
one brand over another. Id. at 7. Through the use of sharply focused advertising, certain
brands become more desirable than others. This results in brand proliferation. See Morein,
Shift from Brand to Product Line Marketing, 53 HARV. Bus. REV. 56 (1975).
39. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 818
(1927).
40. Id.
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Unusual ties have developed between consumers' behavior patterns and brand selection. 1 This is true not only in developed States
but also in developing States where consumers are provided with a
diversified selection of products.4 2 In many families, about ninety
percent of their purchases have been of the same brands for over
three years.4 3 This is especially so where the quality of goods, or
their utility, cannot be examined before purchase. Brand selection is
a major element in consumer selection, and in the development of
goodwill. 4
The trademark further serves to distinguish between trademark
owners' products. This separate function is known as product differentiation. 5 Thus, the consumer has the advantage of refraining from
always purchasing products on a trial and error basis. This affords
the trademark owner with an even greater advantage in two respects:
the trademark differentiates one brand from another and it serves to
46
distinguish similar products.
Consumers develop a preference for certain brands over others
as a result of brand specific advertising.4" The more persuasive the
advertising, the greater the trademark owner's market power becomes. The greater the market power, the easier it becomes to enter
foreign markets. This ultimately leads to greater profits for the
trademark owner.' 8
Each of these factors aids in the creation of goodwill. Besides
creating goodwill, the trademark alerts the buying public to the
goods' quality.49 Although this secondary function is not emphasized, its purpose is closely related to the goodwill function.
41. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 2.
42. Id.
43. Cunningham, Brand Loyalty- What, Where, How Much?, II HARV. Bus. REV. 116
(1956). This pioneering study focused on the types of goods which cannot be examined for
their quality and usefulness until after purchase. The study revealed that brand selection is
virtually unrelated to the consumer's use, needs and socio-economic background.
44. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 7. Such goods are commonly called experience goods
because the consumers must experience the product before they can formulate an opinion about
the product's qualities, including its usefulness and desirability.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Some brands may have identical counterparts under a different brand name, yet consumers may show their preference by repeatedly purchasing one brand over another. Id. at 6-7.
47. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 9. Through the use of persuasive advertising, trademark
owners create market demand for their particular brands. Generally, successful trademarks
will be found among products which have had the greatest and most persuasive advertising
effort put into them.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 2.
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Trademark's Function as a Quality Identifier

Trademarked goods can be traced to their source by virtue of
the trademark. 0 Thus, the consumer is able to assume that the quality of the trademarked goods will remain constant. 5 Even so, it is
52
argued that trademarked goods do not guarantee quality per se.
Rather, the consumer can expect a degree of consistency when
purchasing goods under a particular trademark.53 In this sense it
guarantees that a product will be manufactured and produced with
the same level of quality as before.
The quality identification function is significant in that it
reduces purchasing errors by alerting consumers to the goods' history to quality.5 4 As a result, consumers reduce possible costs related
to purchasing errors.55
One of the main weaknesses of the trademark is its limited ability to guarantee quality. 56 This is due to the nature of the trademark.
Its primary purpose is to protect the trademark owner's, and not the
consumer's, interests.5 7 Nevertheless this function continues to be
helpful to the consuming public.
The trademark, through its identification and goodwill functions, has become an invaluable asset in national and international
markets.5" Still, developing States are increasingly confronted with
restrictive licensing agreements which disproportionately inure the
50. Id.
51. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
52. Id.
53. See Diamond, The HistoricalDevelopment of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 289
(1975).
54. Greer, The Economic Benefits and Costs of Trademarks: Lessons for the Developing
Countries, 7 WORLD DEV. 683 (1979).
55. Id. This is especially true with products known as experience goods. All goods which
cannot be tested by the consumer prior to purchase fall into this category. Examples of experience goods are a bar of soap, a can of soup, a bottle of wine, a bag of dog food, a set of dishes, a
lawnmover, or even a set of luggage. In reality, most consumer products are categorized as
such. Consequently, until a consumer finds a specific product which conforms to his needs and
desires, his purchases will quite often tend to be on a trial and error basis. The cost of trial and
error buying is the reason why the trademark has made such a significant contribution in reducing purchasing errors.
56. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 3. In the United States, measures have been taken in this
area. Courts are reluctant to grant a trademark owner equitable relief against infringers of the
trademark when the product is shown to have been secretly altered by the trademark owner.
See Note, UNCTAD; Trademarks and Developing Countries, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 80, 84
(1980) (hereinafter cited as TDC].
57. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 2.
58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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benefits to the trademark owner.5 9 Present international law does
not address these problems.
II.

DETRIMENTAL IMPACT OF PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW

During the nineteenth century international trade began to grow
significantly and the need for an international regime for the protection of property rights increased accordingly.' The trademark, being a form of protection for intellectual property, needed
international protection. 6' However, as will be demonstrated, none
of the major international agreements address the one sided licensing
arrangements frequently favoring foreign trademark owners.
A.

Paris Convention

The Union Convention of Paris (Paris Convention) is the leading international arrangement for trademarks. 62 Originally concluded in 1883, the Paris Convention is based on the principle of
national treatment, that is, trademarks valid in one State are accorded the same protection as a national mark in any other State.6 3
The Paris Convention lays down the protections, conditions and
limitations afforded trademarks which are eligible for registration in
other foreign States.' The only disadvantage is that it allows each
member State to determine the substantive content of the protection
to be granted to foreign trademark owners. 65 This has produced a
variety of nationalistic approaches in the areas of the registration and
protection of trademarks in foreign States.
The provisions of the Paris Convention are, however, quite flexible.6 6 It sets forth provisos concerning:
59. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
60. NANYENYA-TAKIRAMBUDDE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

60(1980).
61. TDC, supra note 56, at 84.
62. Union Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
25 Stat. 1372, 161 Parry's T.S. 410 (French Text) (Revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900;
at Washington on June 2, 1911; at the Hague on November 6, 1925; at London on June 2,
1934; at Lisbon on October 31, 1958; and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967) [hereinafter cited as
Paris Convention].
63. Id. art. 2.
64. Id. Specifically article 6 pertains to the protection afforded trademarks in member
States. These limitations include prohibiting the registration of trademarks which are reproductions or imitations of well-known marks, or marks which would be likely to create confusion or marks which would impose unfair competition.
65. NANYENYA-TAKIRAMBUDDE, supra note 60, at 66.
66. O'Brien, supra note 19, at 106.
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(1) equal treatment of nationals when in other member
States; (2) right of priority for six months to anyone who has filed
an application for a trademark in a member State while applying
for protection in other member States; (3) cancellation of a trademark in any member State may be effected only after a reasonable
period if use is a compulsory condition for registration in a particular State; (4) trademarks registered in member States shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in other member States;
(5) nationals are assured that their own member States will afford
them protection against unfair competition; and (6) member States
are permitted to enter into special agreements for the protection of
industrial property among themselves, as long as67they do not contravene the provisions of the Paris Convention.
Although the Paris Convention provides for trademark protection in the context of registration privileges, it does not create an
international trademark.6 8
Were an international trademark to be created, the problems
confronting developing States would still remain. In fact, these
problems would be aggravated because each trademark would receive
international protection by virtue of its registration. 6 9 Any international protection would inure almost exclusively to the benefit of the
trademark owner. 70 The protection the Paris Convention currently
bestows on trademarks in a member State is extended only after the
trademark is individually registered in that particular member
State. 7'
The Paris Convention also advocates equal treatment for all
member States, 72 but it overlooks the fact that developing States, as a
whole, are not on an equal footing with developed States.7 3 The
Paris Convention therefore fails to recognize the interests of developing States in two respects. First, the agreement fails to provide developing States with preferential treatment in the area of trademark use
and registration. Second, by the terms of the agreement, developing
States are prevented from entering into separate agreements outside
67. See, Paris Convention, supra note 62, arts. 2, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 19.
68. Spitals, The UNCTAD Report on the Role of Trademarks, I I N.Y. SCH. INT'L COMP.
L. 369, 373 (1981).
69. See infra notes 77, 83 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 18. Because the majority of trademark owners are found in developed
States, such protection would bolster the strength of foreign trademark owners. Policies of this
kind give the trademark owner more preferences and further increase the imbalance between
developing and developed States. See also infra note 97.
71. Spitals, supra note 68, at 374.
72. O'Brien, supra note 19, at 107.
73. Id. See also Paris Convention, supra note 62, arts. 3, 13, 16.
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the Paris Convention which would better protect their interests but
run contrary to the terms of the agreement."4
It should be noted that the Paris Convention does not allude to
trademark licensing agreements. However, this is not the only international agreement which fails to do so.
B.

Arrangement of Madrid

The Arrangement of Madrid was originally concluded in 18917,
as an agreement providing for the international registration and protection of trademarks.7 6 It was created to alleviate the burden on the
trademark owner of having to register a trademark in each individual
State.7 7
The Arrangement of Madrid advocates that the international
trademark system be just and that member States be treated equally.
The International Bureau grants an approved trademark a registration period of twenty years.7 ' Renewal of a registered mark can easily be effected by the payment of a basic fee.7 9
The Arrangement of Madrid was a revolutionary concept. It
was, however, unsuccessful. It has proven to be ineffective as demonstrated by the small number of States which have become members of
the agreement. 8 0 In 1976 membership only increased to twentyfour.8"
In its attempt to create an international mark, the Arrangement
of Madrid focused only on the area of international registration.
(This focus has subverted the interests of developing States, as a
whole, because of the lack of any preferential treatment which they
require.) The arrangement of Madrid fails to provide for licensing
agreements. Even the most recent endeavors of this kind omit reference to trademark licensing agreements.
74. O'Brien, supra note 19, at 109.
75. Arrangement Respecting the International Registration of Trade Marks, Apr. 14,
1891, 175 Parry's T.S. 57. (Revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900; at Washington on June 2,
1911; at the Hague on Nov. 6, 1925; at London on June 2, 1934; and at Nice on June 15, 1957)
(hereinafter cited as Arrangement of Madrid].
76. O'Brien, supra note 19, at 102.
77. Id. at 110.
78. Arrangement of Madrid, supra note 75, art. 6.
79. Id. art. 7.
80. In 1957, seventeen countries signed the Arrangement of Madrid. Those were Austria,
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, German Federal Republic, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and

Tunisia.
81. Id.
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Conference of Vienna

The Trademark Registration Treaty was concluded at Vienna in
1973.8" This Treaty was to be drafted in the same framework as that
of the Paris Convention. It was to provide for much simpler requirements and a reduced filing fee for the registration of an international
trademark. 83
An unexpected change from prior agreements was contained in
article 4084 which provided a type of preference to developing
States. 5 Article 40 allows developing States to avail themselves of
the right to file international registration of trademarks under the
Treaty without becoming a signatory.86
Specifically, because of the provisions set forth in article 40, it is
highly unlikely that developing States will adhere to the Treaty.87
The reasons for this are fourfold. First, developing States are uninterested in obtaining international registration for their trademarks.8
Second, they are wholly opposed to facilitating the expansion of foreign trademarks into their countries. 9 Third, article 40 grants them
a "take your cake and eat it too" prerogative.' Furthermore, key
States, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian States, the Soviet Union, and Japan also have not acceded to the
Treaty. 9'
Although some consideration was made for developing States
their interests were again significantly under represented. 92 The most
powerful participants in the Conference of Vienna were multina82. Trademark Registration Treaty Post Conference Information, 920 O.G. Pat. Off. 257
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Conference of Vienna]. This treaty did not enter into force because
of the failure of enough States to accede to it. A review of some of its key provisions explains
why most States do not favor it. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
83.

S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS 1527 (1975).

84. Id. at 1526.
85. O'Brien, supra note 19, at 110-11. This provision, during an initial period of five, ten
or fifteen years, gave nationals and residents of certain developing States the right to file international applications even if such States had not yet acceded to the Treaty. However, it is of no
effect, since the treaty never went into effect due to the lack of signatories.
86. LADAS, supra note 83, at 1526.

87. Id. at 1528.
88. Id. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
89. LADAS, supra note 83, at 1528.

90. Developing States would be granted similar protection without having to adhere to the
treaty. By not having to adhere to it, developing States would not have to afford other member
States similar protection.
91. Id.
92. O'Brien, supra note 19, at 110-11.
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tional corporations rather than governmental entities.9 3
D.

Summation of Agreements

In review, there have been three major attempts at creating an
international system for trademark registration and protection.9 4
Each merely provides for the registration of trademarks9" and for the
protection of trademark owners' property rights.9 6
This limited coverage is detrimental to developing States because none of the international agreements touch on the problems
relating to their interests in international trademark licensing agreements. The most benefit any of these agreements can offer developing States is a system of automatic international trademark
registration and protection. Due to the imbalance of trademark ownership between developed and developing States, this is of little value
to the developing States. 97 Of greater importance is the manner in
which new technology can be transferred from developed States to
developing States. 98 This is accomplished via licensing agreements
between the foreign trademark owner and the domestic licensee. 99
III.

TRADEMARK LICENSING AGREEMENTS:
DEVELOPING STATES

THEIR EFFECT ON

The trademark licensing agreement has been used by developing
States to introduce new products, processes and technology into their
countries. " This use is due to the fact that most of the valuable,
useful and transferable technology is possessed by parties located in
developed States.' 0 ' The transfer takes place when the developing
State enters into a licensing agreement to acquire technology it does
not have. The licensor supplies technology and opens a plant in the
93. LADAS, supra note 83, at 1526.
94. See supra notes 62-93 and accompanying text.
95.

LADAS, supra note 83, at 1528.

96. Id.
97. Id. See supra notes 18, 70 and accompanying text.
98. Ball, supra note 7, at 161.
99. Id. at 163.
100. Cf. Olofsson, The Importance of Patents and Technology Progress in Developing Countries, MADRID CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE WORLD II (The World Peace Through

Law Center, No. 58, 1979). In determining the relative costs and benefits in the transfer of new
technology, developing States have concluded that the utilization of domestic resources including the employment and training of domestic labor is most desirable. Their goal is to obtain
new technology at reasonable costs. The trademark makes use of domestic resources in a costeffective way enabling them to achieve this end.
101. W. BROOKHART, CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF LICENSING AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 38 (1980).
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developing State so that the domestic licensee can manufacture the
product in either the same or a similar way. This ensures that the
quality of the product adheres to the same level as that of other prod02
ucts manufactured under that same trademark.
Generally, the trademark licensing agreement is a component of
a comprehensive arrangement involving the transfer of technology. t°3 In recent years, the costs attributed to domestic licensees in
developing States have increased so dramatically that licensing agreements have become a burden to the licensees.'°4
Developing States now look upon trademarks as symbols of the
foreign business influence which inhibits their development. 0 5 This
10 6
influence is expanded through the use of persuasive advertising.
The advertisement of foreign products diverts consumers' attention
and allegiance from domestic products. 0 7 This results in a redefining of local consumption patterns, rather than conforming foreign
products to the needs of the particular State.' 0 8 Foreign influence
has been so pervasive throughout all sectors of developing States that
there has been a redefinition of basic needs."°
Consumers who are exposed to this type of advertising are pre0
ferring foreign trademarked goods over domestic counterparts."
This tendency also extends to the lower income sectors in developing
102. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
103. Correa, Main Issues in the Regulation of License Arrangements on Foreign Trademarks. the Latin American Experience, 7 WORLD DEV. 705 (1979). Included in these comprehensive arrangements are trademarks, patents and other industrial property rights.
104. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 19. In most types of technology transfer agreements,
royalty payments are an economic burden to the licensee. However, in most trademark licensing agreements, long-term costs are the obstacle to profit, rather than royalty payments.
105. Spitals, supra note 68, at 380. A frequent complaint echoes through the developing
States regarding the ill suited technology conveyed by developed States. The discontent surrounds the claim that developed States transfer industrial technology which is inappropriate to
the developing States' needs. See Helleiner, The Role of MultinationalCorporationsin the Less
Developed Countries' Trade in Technology, 3 WORLD DEV. 161, 166-67 (1975).
106. Spitals, supra note 68, at 380.
107. Id. Since purchasing power is concentrated in the area of foreign products, there has
been a redefinition of certain basic needs.
108. Id. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
109. Vargas, Major Innovations Regarding Trade and Service Marks in the Newly Revised
Mexican Law on Inventions and Marks. A Mexican Perspective, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 188-89
(1979). For example, consider the following excerpt which supports this conclusion:
The life of the middle to upper middle class bears a close resemblance to [their counterparts] in the [United States]. A Mexican male shaves every morning with a Trac II
Gillette razor after applying an Old Spice shaving foam, or he connects his Sunbeam
or Remington electric razor. . . . His clothes include Arrow shirts, Countess Mara
ties, Florsheim shoes, Hickok cufflinks and Hart Shaffner & Marx suits. His food is
stored in a GeneralElectric or Westinghouse refrigerator. . . . (emphasis added).
110. Spitals, supra note 68, at 380.
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States."I' This hurts the developing communities in two ways. First,
consumer expenditures focus on desired products rather than those
which fulfill their necessities." 2 Second, production of goods bearing
foreign trademarks often creates less employment, than does customary indigenous activity." 3 This is largely due to the required impor-4
tation of resources and skill via technology licensing agreements.,
Often, the technology transfer is conditioned on the developing State
accepting such terms. "
In response to the developing States' continuing problems in the
area of restrictive licensing agreements, the UN Conference on Trade6
and Developement (UNCTAD) has proposed several alternatives."
The proposals it suggests are as follows: (1) the complete abolition of
trademarks in certain sectors; (2) the institution of compulsory licensing of trademarks; (3) the regulation of certain trademark related
matters; (4) quality identification through trademark legislation; and
(5) quality identification independent of the trademark system." 7
Upon close examination, the first three UNCTAD proposals
clearly frustrate the basic purpose of the trademark."I8 Under either
a compulsory licensing system or a system without trademarks, the
indications of the quality of specific goods would be nonexistent.
Manufacturers and distributors will lose the incentive to produce and
monitor the quality of goods sold under the trademark." 9 Without
11. Vargas, supra note 109, at 108. See also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
112. Spitals, supra note 68, at 380.
113. Id.
114. Often the developing State lacks the appropriate resources and skill needed to develop
or manufacture a product according to the specifications of the licensor. This is not entirely
detrimental, because generally speaking, this is the method by which technology is transferred
to a developing State. Without the importation of skill and labor, the developing State could
not produce the particular product involved in the license agreement.
115. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 36. In some cases, however, the developing State simply
lacks the kind of skill or resources necessary to produce or market the product. The real
problem, therefore, lies in the misallocation of resources. In the past, many licensing agreements included the importation of skill and resources when the developing State already possessed those items. By not utilizing existing supplies, the cost of manufacturing or producing
the item correspondingly increases for the domestic licensee. See supra note 7.
116. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 36. UNCTAD was created in 1963. Its purpose is to aid
developing States in promoting the regulation of international trade.
117. Id. at 38-41.
118. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
119. McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark- Remedy or Penalty?, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 197, 227 (1977). The trademark is primarily a marketing device by which the
trademark owner can build economic and market strength. If the trademark were abolished,
there would be no distinguishing feature between same or similar products. A manufacturer or
producer might be tempted to take shortcuts in production or reduce the quality of the product
if he, in turn, could save money. See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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monitoring a product's quality standards, the trademark will cease to
have significance and products will become either generic or deceptive. 120 Consumers in developing States will be deprived of any guarantee of quality. Producers, foreign and domestic, will be free to
market items without proper checks and assurances. Therefore, implementation of any of the first three UNCTAD proposals would
have devastating effects on the goals and interests of developing
States.
UNCTAD's last two proposals, however, are too difficult to implement. First, the trademark already serves as a quality identifier
for consumer purposes. 12 Second, the trademark was meant to
guarantee a degree of consistency in the level of quality a product
possesses. 122 Third, the trademark's primary function rests in its
ability to distinguish similar products. 23 These were the sole and
original aims of the trademark.
Many developing States are independently taking steps to confront this influence by providing local industry with preferential
treatment. 24 In addition, domestic producers are taking advantage
of the presence of foreign technology. 12 ' Foreign trademarks are
viewed as vehicles by which developing producers can obtain access
to new technologies. 26 Included in such a package is the goodwill
surrounding the trademarked product. By enhancing ther domestic
skills and technologies, developing States will acquire the benefits of
the goodwill. 2' 7
An alternative step taken by developing States has been the institution of harsh national legislation. One of the most severe has
taken place in Mexico. In 1976, Mexico enacted linking requirements. 12 ' The Mexican law required Mexican trademarks to be
29
joined with all products manufactured under a foreign trademark.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 50, 55 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
124. Ball, supra note 7, at 160.
125. Id.
126. Id. As mentioned earlier in this Comment, the tradematk itself is not a conveyor of
technology. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. However, it is generally a part of a
larger licensing agreement. For example, in 1975 nearly half of all contracts for the transfer of
technology entered into by Mexico included a trademark licensing agreement of one form or
another. Soberanis, supra note 2, at 721
127. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 15.
128. Ball, supra note 7, at 165. Linking is the coupling of a trademark owned by the local
licensee with that of the foreign trademark owner.
129. When a domestic licensee produces or manufactures a product with a foreign license,

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986

15

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 14
INTERNATIONAL

TRADEMARK

LICENSING

Moreover, foreign trademark license agreements had to specifically
provide that a local Mexican trademark would be associated with the
foreign trademark.' 0.

The linking requirements are encouraged in some States in order
to take complete advantage of the goodwill the foreign trademark has
developed.' 3 ' In addition, they ensure that the local licensees will
have a buying market in the event the trademark license is terminated.' 32 This could mislead the public into believing that they are
buying the same quality product even after the trademark license is
33
terminated. 1
The effect of the Mexican legislation was that foreign trademark
owners were reluctant to enter into licensing agreements with domestic producers. Due to its fear of losing a significant portion of the
foreign market, Mexico enacted new legislation in 1982. 13 This new
law gives effect to trademark licensing agreements in Mexico upon
the recording of the agreement in the National Register for the
Transfer of Technology and the Trademark Office.' 35 Without
proper recording of the licensing agreement, such agreements are
given no effect.
Brazil has enacted a similar type of legislation.' 3 6 However, instead of requiring joint use, it makes optional the joint use of foreign
and domestic trademarks. 31 Colombia has followed these States by
38
encouraging the joint use of foreign and domestic trademarks.1

Other developing States have adopted different measures to
abolish trademark protection specifically in the pharmaceutical
area. 1 39 Cuba, for example, encourages the sale of drugs under gethe product would have to carry a domestic trademark together with the foreign trademark.
Id.
130. Id. at 166. The linking provisions in Mexico were to become effective as of February
1978. Just prior to that date, the government announced the granting of one year extensions
and continues to grant such extensions.
131. Id.
132. Id. This creates the possibly erroneous impression to consumers that they are still
buying the same goods or goods of the same quality as those previously identified by the joint
trademarks of the licensee and the licensor.
133. Id. Without express disclosure, the public is unaware of any change in the product's
durability, use, safety and quality.
134. Ball, supra note 7, at 166.
135. Id.
136. Daniel, Notes from Brazil, 82 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 101 (1984).
137. TDC, supra note 56, at 86.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 85.
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neric names."4 Sri Lanka seeks a reduction in the number of drugs
on the market and, like Cuba, encourages the use of generic names
for drugs, rather than the trademarked brand names. 14 ' Afghanistan, on the other hand, has taken harsher and more immediate ac142
tion in this area by requiring the use of generic names for drugs.
Another method of regulating the use of the trademark is
through quality certification or government control over advertising. 143 Both Venezuela and Mexico have enacted legislation against
the use of misleading and false advertising." 4 A further method of
curbing the influence and power of the foreign trademark is by placing a ceiling on the remittance of royalties by the domestic producer.1"45 Members of the Andean Pact, as well as new members
such as Brazil, India and North Korea have pursued this course of
conduct. 146
Each of these limitations restricts the bargaining powers of the
parties to the licensing agreement. The foreign trademark owner
may be harmed initially due to such restrictions. However, it is the
domestic licensees in the developing State who truly suffer when the
trademark owner refrains from marketing his products in that State.
Developing States make a fundamental mistake when they implement severe restrictions in trademark licensing agreements. In
doing so, they overlook the primary function of the trademark.
Without a doubt, the trademark plays a vital role in advancing the
economies of many developing States. 147 Over the past two decades,
it was via the trademark that developing States often created an indigenous technology.

148

Domestic producers in developing States often lack the re-

149
sources and skill to manufacture and market quality products.

This frequently leads to an increase in products with consistently low
quality. 50 Although trademarked goods do not guarantee quality, it
140. Id.
141.

Id.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 86.
144. Id.
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. Hansen, Economic Aspects of Technology Transfer to Developing Countries, 4 1. 1. C.
429 (1980).
148. Ball, supra note 7, at 161. The resources referred to are capital, trained work force
and research facilities. See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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is suggested that they guarantee a degree of consistency in the quality
of goods. ' In many developing States, where literacy levels are low,
the trademark becomes a recognized symbol.' 52 Consumers
purchase trademarked goods expecting to receive the same degree of
quality as before. This is added motivation for a trademark owner to
his goods are produced with a consistency in the
ensure that
3
5
quality.'-

Ideally, the trademark licensing agreement serves the function
of marketing a trademarked product which informs the consumer of
the origin and the identity of the manufacturer of the product. 5 4
The restrictions implemented by the licensor ensure that the trademarked product is manufactured, produced and marketed in a manner acceptable both to the trademark owner and the consuming
public.'" Consequently, the trademark licensing agreement is vital
to the continued existence of the benefits inurred to the foreign trademark owner.
IV.

TRADEMARK LICENSING AGREEMENTS:

THEIR EFFECT ON

FOREIGN TRADEMARK OWNERS

A trademark licensing agreement is a conduit through which
technology is transferred by authorizing the licensee to use the
trademark.

56

The licensee's authorized use of the trademark is strictly limited
to the product(s) specified in the licensing agreement. 5 ' The licensing agreement indicates the manner in which the product is to be
manufactured and/or marketed via the trademark. It also establishes the trademark owner as the one who is ultimately responsible
for the product. 58
There are two kinds of trademark licenses; passive and active.' 5 9
Where the licensee maintains considerable control over the use of the
trademark and is required to pay a limited amount in royalties, the
15 1. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 36.
152. Ball, supra note 7, at 161.
153. Id.
154. Gabay, The Role of Trademarks in Consumer Protectionand Development in Developing Countries, 3 INDUS. PROP. 102, 106, 109 (1981).
155.

Id.

156. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
157.

Gabay, supra note 154, at 108.

158. Id.
159. Id. at 110.
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licensor is said to have a passive license. 160 An active license is created when the exact opposite is agreed upon 16 1 and the licensor is
actively involved in transferring technology, and assisting in the
1 62
manufacturing, distributing and advertising of the product.
In most States, the trademark owner is not required to license
the use of his trademark in order for a domestic producer to make
use of it. 163 However, in many States a trademark will lose its protection and classification as a trademark if it is used without permission, for example, if there is no trademark licensing agreement."M
The trademark protection may also be destroyed if a trademark
owner permits the trademark to be used without establishing the na65
ture and quality of the goods in the agreement.
Due to the increase in restrictive national legislation in trademark licensing by developing States, foreign trademark owners have
intensified control over their ownership of the trademark. Consequently, many foreign trademark owners have entered into licensing
agreements in which the licensee in a developing State is restricted in
his right to use the trademark. 166 In order to maintain control over
the use of the trademark, many licensing agreements specify that all
use of the trademark by the licensee, including any registrations
67
thereof, inure to the benefit of the licensor.
An examination must be made into the importance the trademark and the trademark licensing agreement have on the foreign
trademark owner. First, a trademark is seldom licensed alone but is
6
usually one portion of an agreement for the transfer of technology. 1
Second, the trademark is readily identifiable by purchasers and com160.
161.
162.
163.
(1983).
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Coffey, Trademark Considerations in International Trade, 19 L. NOTES 27, 29
Id.

165. Id. Some States require a trademark to be in continued use, some require a trademark
and trademark licensing agreement to be registered in that State, still others require both before
the State will extend protection to the trademark contained in the licensing agreement. The
States only insuring protection of a trademark when both the foreign trademark and the licensing agreements are registered, are England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and
South Africa.
If the licensing agreement is not specifically tailored to the needs of the licensor, the trademark becomes vulnerable to misuse. Such misuse will also lead to the termination of trademark protection by the State.
166. Id. at 28.
167. Id.

168. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 23. See also Besso, 1982 Licensing Law Handbook § 1.02
[6] (1982); supra note 8.
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petitors of the product.' 6 9 Third, it offers protection to the maker of
the particular goods through national legislation in each individual
State. The protection accorded the trademark owner is of potentially
greater value when compared to the protection afforded the patent
holder. This is due to the fact that the trademark is capable of existing externally. 7 °
As noted earlier in this Comment, one of the trademark's important functions is as a quality identifier and distinguisher of goods."'
These characteristics have a direct bearing on the product's goodwill,
which, as far as the trademark owner is concerned, signifies its monetary value.
Take for example the computer software field. Patent, copyright
and trade secret laws directly protect the contents of a particular
72

technology. 1

This means that the components, ideas, and overall technology
are shielded from duplication. The trademark is incapable of protecting any of these elements. If the trademark is registered, the
trademark owner can guard only against the unauthorized use of his
trademark. ' The trademark has, however, also developed into a
kind of marketing device.' 7 4 Long after a product's patent has expired, the trademark can still serve to distinguish the product and
assure that the product is manufactured with a corresponding degree
of consistency.' 75 Further, a technology owner can use the trademark in addition to employing the use of other kinds of industrial
property in order to reach a larger market. Hence, even in the computer software field, the trademark is used in order to further the
proprietary interests of the technology owner.' 7 6
The economic lure of the trademark is that it is already an asset.
By the time the domestic licensee acquires its use, the trademark
169. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
170. As previously stated, the trademark can be renewed simply upon the payment of a fee.
Cf White, Trademark Protection of Computer Software, 8 A. P. L. A. 279 (1980). Patents
protect the contents of technology whereas trademarks protect the name of a manufacturer/producer. The same product could be manufactured by another under a different brand
name, and not violate trademark laws.
171. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
172. White, supra note 170, at 279.
173. See supra notes 63, 71 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
175. White, supra note 170, at 280, 281 and 287. See also supra notes 45, 46, 50 and 51.
This relates to the trademark's primary and secondary functions. Its value to the trademark
owner is enhanced by a potentially eternal life.
176. Id.
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owner has already developed the product, its goodwill, and has established its level of quality. 177 These original costs are incurred by the
trademark owner. However, once these are established, the trademark owner is not required to make much more investment toward
developing his product.
The measures taken by several developing States resulting in endangering the protection of the foreign trademark directly usurps the
trademark owner's proprietary interest. By restricting the trademark
owner's access to a particular market, the trademark owner loses out
on any potential licensing agreements and resulting profits. The
measures do not, however, endanger the ownership interest in the
contents of the technology. Without adequate remuneration for its
use, however, the technology trademark owner will select a more
favorable region in which to market his technology and
commodities. 7' 8
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING
A BALANCED SYSTEM FOR TRADEMARK LICENSING
AGREEMENTS

There are several types of policy alternatives to consider in contemplating a better trademark licensing system. Some of the suggestions made during the 1979 UNCTAD Conference, however, would
only serve to eradicate the protection of the trademark. 179 The need
for an international system for trademark licensing is evident in several respects.
The majority of the trademarks in developing States are owned
by transnational corporations located in developed market economies. 8 ' The technology connected with these trademarks is accordingly the property of individuals and entitites located in developed
States. The domestic producers in the developing States have two
options. They can either enter into a licensing agreement with the
177. Gabay, supra note 154, at I ll; see also Ball, supra note 7, at 163. This is an attractive
alternative to other forms of market entry, especially for developing States where trial and error
is a difficult and costly way to introduce any kind of product into the market. By licensing an
already existing trademark, the licensee enjoys the additional profits gained from the goodwill
the trademark owner has already developed. This is generally in the form of international
reputation.
178. FINNEGAN AND GOLDSCHEIDER, supra note 10, at 520.35. One view is that the multinational companies, which possess a considerable portion of world technology, are not to be
blamed for the imbalance in the licensing agreements. It is claimed that the businessman out to
make a quick profit is the one who has brought the multinationals into disrepute. Id. at 520.33.
179. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 38; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text.
180. UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 45.
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foreign trademark owners or compete against the foreign trademarks.'' The latter option would require the domestic producer to
single-handedly embark into the international market with his own
product and trademark.
The trademark owners enter into licensing agreements for various reasons. Some of these reasons include the following:
a) to earn royalty income;
b) to buy required additional research and development for a potentially valuable technology;
c) to improve a foreign subsidiary's performance by lending it
technical assistance;
d) to acquire market strength, capital and market assets, or an
interest in them;
e) to help market products, services, raw materials or equipment;
f) to obtain technology by a grant-back of the technology developed by a licensee;
g) to test a market which may be assessed later either by manufacture-and-sale or joint venture operations;
h) to reach a market not otherwise reachable;
i) to reduce risk;
j) to sell a company;
82
k) to adapt a product to a local market.'
On the other hand, some of the domestic licensees' reasons for entering into a licensing agreement include the following:
a) to settle a patent or trade-secret dispute;
b) to avoid risk of research and development expense not producing a return on investment;
c) to acquire needed technology;
d) to acquire a needed right to operate;
83
e) to supplement the licensees' own research and development. '
It would appear from this list, that the trademark owner has more to
lose with the eradication of trademark protection in developing
States. This, however is misleading. The losers would also be the
developing States' domestic producers, manufacturers and
consumers.
The trademark owner would lose a portion of his market and
potential for economic profit. The developing States would be deprived of the opportunity to acquire a significant amount of new and
desperately needed technology.'8 4 The domestic licensees and manu181. Id.
182. ARNOLD, WHITE & DURKEE, 1984 LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK § 201 (1984).

183. Id. at 9, 10.
184. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. The trademark is an integral part of the
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facturers would forfeit the economic profits associated with the
trademark's goodwill."' Finally, consumers would be deprived of
greater product selection and a corresponding guarantee of consis1 6
tency in the quality of products. 1
Following are guidelines by which a balanced licensing agreement could be created. Each proposal is a reasonable alternative to
the present system of licensing. This is because both the trademark
owners and the developing States must come to a compromise and
spread the costs and risks in order to protect the trademark and save
the trademark licensing system. Without compromise, trademark licensing agreements and the protection of trademarks as a whole will
continue to deteriorate. 8 7
First a ceiling on the amount of royalties a licensee must remit
to the licensor must be implemented.' 88 "Royalty" is just one common way of referring to these fees. Such fees often take the form of
dividends, technical fees, interest payments, over-pricing of imports
or under-invoicing exports. 1 89 These arrangements should be restricted in duration as well. The restriction should depend upon the
type of technology involved and its value.
Second, the licensor must consider using whatever resources are
available in the developing State, if such are appropriate for use with
the transferred technology. 9° The resources the developing State
has are often misallocated in the process of entering into the licensing
licensing of technology. It is licensed alone or with other kinds of industrial and intellectual
property. If the trademark owners become reluctant to license their trademarked products,
developing States will be unable to acquire the technology associated with the product unless it
is available through other unlikely means.
185. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. The purchasing costs increase because
consumers would have no trademark to rely on. They would once again have to resort to a
kind of trial and error purchasing.
187. See supra notes 7, 20-21 and accompanying text. Even if developing States were to
continue mandatory harsh trademark legislation, as in the case of India, Mexico, Sri Lanka,
Peru, Venezuela and others, the trademark owner would still be afforded protection in most
other States. The issue then would be whether such protection would be of any significance.
Most likely, it would not. If trademark protection in much of the world becomes impaired or
diminished, other States would have very little incentive to continue such protection.
188. See UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 35. This can be done by calculating a percentage
ceiling above which licensors can not require licensees to agree to and pay.
189. Id. at 36. Royalties tend to be one form of direct cost to the licensee. In order to
acquire the desired technology and obtain a portion of the market, the licensee must pay the
price for each. For example, U.S. licensors received over $4 billion in royalties and fee income
from foreign licensees in 1978. This figure includes royalties from developing as well as developed States. See ARNOLD, WHITE & DURKEE, supra note 182, at 9.
190. In the interest of promoting efficient world trade, economic theory and practice are
concerned with the most efficient use of resources.
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agreement. 1 ' A more suitable allocation would defray part of the
cost involved in the licensing agreement. In addition, it would enable
the developing State to use its labor force and natural resources more
efficiently.
Third, even if advertising expenditures remain the responsiblity
of the licensee, the licensor's involvement in the kind of advertising
adopted must be qualified. The licensor should not employ advertising tactics which would overcome consumers and persuade them to
abandon domestic products for the same or similar foreign trademarked product.' 9 2 The developing State should have a proportionate involvement in selecting the kind of advertising it wants for the
promotion of the product.
Fourth, the grant-back of technology developed by the licensee
must be restricted to certain kinds of high technology. The developing State should not continue to develop technology for the trademark owner without a quid pro quo. At the very least, the
developing State should acquire equal access to, and use of, the technology it develops for a licensor. If this is not acceptable, royalty fees
and other costs should be reduced in order that the developing State
pays only for what it receives.
Fifth, the licensee should enjoy a portion of the benefits resulting
from the development of goodwill.I9 3 There might be limitations to
191. This misallocation of resources results from one of two possible causes. Either the
technology that is being transferred is not suited to the developing State's needs or resources
which are available in the developing State are not utilized. In both circumstances improper
use of available resources harms the developing State. See UNCTAD, supra note 4. See also
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
192. See Ball, supra note 7, at 173. See also UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 37. This is a
significant consideration in developing States or lesser developed States where the emphasis is
on satisfying the basic needs of consumers. This is why deference must be made to the consumers' needs. When such consideration is not given, the ultimate result is shifting of the additional cost upon the consumer. See Spitals, supra note 68, at 379.
The advertising agency is a firmly established entity employed in developed and developing States. It is present in developing States because of the significant foreign participation in
the advertising industry. Since most agencies either originate in developed market economies
or are composed of individuals from developed market economies, much of their advertising is
geared toward that type of market, rather than the socio-economic levels of particular developing States. This type of advertising furthers the misallocation of the developing State's resources. See also Greer, supra note 54, at 690-91.
193. A common example is the arbitrary termination of the license to the domestic licensee
after he has expended considerable amounts of resources over a number of years to build up the
foreign licensor's goodwill. Without being permitted to use the trademarked product, the licensee suffers a complete loss. The developing State can also market a new domestic product
which most certainly enjoys much less distinction or notability than its foreign counterpart or
license another foreign trademarked product. Either way, the licensee has to start work anew.
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this proposal depending upon the period of time over which the license is to be in effect.
Sixth, the linking of domestic and foreign trademarks should be
mandatory under certain circumstances. For example, if a trademark licensing agreement provides for a long term arrangement, the
linking provision should be implemented. This would ensure that if
and when the license is terminated, the domestic licensee would be
able to continue marketing the product under its own trademark.
This type of linking provision has been employed with little success
due to its harshness.' 9 4 The key to its success is that it should not be
employed unilaterally but selectively.' 9 5 If the license is for a short
term arrangement, the linking agreement should be entirely optional.
In this kind of situation, the licensee usually does not invest considerable time, labor and money into a one-sided arrangement.
Seventh, export restrictions by the licensor should be eliminated
in the case of a long term license. The Andean Pact countries have
already implemented such a strategy.' 9 6 When the parties enter into
long term licensing agreements, more is invested and sacrificed by
each. The domestic licensees must be given the opportunity to fully
utilize the technology they have contracted to develop and market
for the licensors.
Eighth, any fraudulent or illegal use of a foreign trademark by
the licensor must lead to cancellation in the developing State. 19 This
would also have the effect of voiding the trademark licensing
agreement.
All of these recommendations could be brought before an international forum for thorough discussion and review by all member
194. Mexico's linking provisions were too harsh and unreasonable. It provided for an
across the board mandate that foreign trademarked products could only be marketed jointly
with a domestic trademark. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
195. If the license agreement sets forth a reasonable rationale for termination of the license,
then linking may be unnecessary. However, in a long-term arrangement linking may still need
to be considered as an alternative unless the licensee is provided with a fair lump sum compensation upon termination. See Ball, supra note 7, at 173.
196. The Andean Pact is in force, in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
The Agreement is called the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement concluded in
Cartegena, Colombia. The Treaty's objective is the economic integration of member States,
and a mutually beneficial system for implementing trademark registration. Taylor and
Bentata, Trademark User Requirements in Latin America, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 109, 123
(1984).
One of the provisions is concerned with export restrictions. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
197. Id.
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States. One such forum could be UNCTAD. 9 8 A possible obstacle
is that UNCTAD tends to be a mouthpiece solely for developing
countries. Another forum could be the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), a recently created organ of the United Nations specifically providing legal and technical assistance in the area
of intellectual property.' 99 Its responsibilities also include assembling and disseminating information among member States. Because
WIPO tends to take a more objective stance in this area, it might be a
more viable choice for presenting and implementing these proposals.
These proposals would be voted on by member States. Upon adoption, they would have the effect of international law, and would be
legally binding.20 0
Codification of these proposals would be beneficial both to foreign trademark owners and domestic licensees. First, it would encourage licensees in developing States to enter into licensing
agreements, because the costs would be shared with the licensor.
Second, foreign trademark owners would not be reluctant to enter
developing market economies because they would be protected from
any future restrictive domestic legislation. Lastly, the likelihood of
disseminating new technology to developing States would be increased thereby gradually decreasing the world technology
imbalance.
V.

CONCLUSION

The trademark is often licensed alone or in conjunction with
other industrial property in a transfer of technology licensing agreement. 20 ' This type of arrangement informs consumers of the origin
and identity of a product.20 2 The trademark's purpose is to identify
goods and individual levels by quality.20 3 Both these functions have
a significant impact on the development of the product's goodwill. 2"
In most licensing agreements, the foreign trademark owner retains all control over a product's goodwill. This is true even when
the licensee in the developing State has exerted efforts toward devel198. Sittenfeld, Sao Paulo Conference on the Law of the World (The World Peace Through
Law Center, 1981).
199. Id.
200. Id.at lOand 11.
201. Ball, supra note 7, at 163.
202. Gabay, supra note 154, at 109.
203. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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oping it. 215 Over the years, the costs and risks of entering into a

trademark licensing agreement have increased dramatically. 2° Consequently, developing States have been implementing increasingly
harsh measures to restrict the foreign trademark owners from entering their markets.207 Thus, the foreign trademark owners are becoming more reluctant to market their technology and products in those
developing States implementing this kind of legislation.
Should the trademark licensing system remain as it is today, the
trademark's protection would be seriously endangered. Yet without
trademark protection the transfer of much needed technology to developing States would cease or be greatly inhibited.
Currently, no international agreement or treaty addresses the
problems encountered with the licensing agreement. Without modification of the present system the protection afforded the trademark
will continue to deteriorate.
Several proposals are recommended to be reviewed and codified
into an international agreement. Recommendations include, implementing a linking option for the parties to a licensing agreement, a
ceiling on royalties and other fees, a division of advertising costs, and
the elimination of export restrictions under certain conditions.
An international agreement with respect to these peviously mentioned areas of trademark licensing agreements would encourage the
proliferation of technology transfers from developed States to developing States through the use of such agreements. This would aid the
developing States in their quest for new technology, and would benefit foreign trademark owners by reopening markets which have been
virtually closed to them.2 "8
Eva Csiszdr Goldman

205.
206.
207.
208.

See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Ball, supra note 7, at 160.
See Williams, supra note 23, at 22; Ladas, supra note 83, at 1906.
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